Corporate legitimacy, the public's general perception that a company's actions are consistent with shared norms of appropriate behavior, enables corporations to maintain their operating licenses and status as publicly sanctioned institutions. 1, 2 When public approval is threatened, reduced, or withdrawn, however, a legitimacy crisis occurs: a corporation's practices become something to be addressed and perhaps modified significantly in response. 2 As delegitimation of the tobacco industry and denormalization of tobacco use reconfigure the social meaning of tobacco, the tobacco industry faces legitimacy crises beyond those experienced intermittently by most other corporate entities. 2---7 In light of the deadly, addictive nature of its products and the tobacco industry's now well-documented history of deceit, legitimacy crises may be particularly difficult for tobacco companies. 7 We examined executive deliberations at Philip Morris USA in 2000 to 2002 as the company's leadership sought to restore legitimacy through a formal corporate social responsibility commitment. Struggling to reconcile responsibility principles with Philip Morris's history and its products' deadliness, these executives questioned the purpose and value of Philip Morris itself. Although previous studies have explored Philip Morris's evolving interest in corporate social responsibility, 8---12 none have examined the internal processes by which a tobacco company tries to explicitly address its raison d'être. The evolution of this process at executive levels of the largest US tobacco company suggests that tobacco companies face not only ongoing external public relations concerns, but also internalized legitimacy struggles that may create openings for policy innovation to address the tobacco epidemic more effectively on the supply side.
METHODS
Litigation against the tobacco industry has resulted in release of more than 13 million previously undisclosed industry documents, 13, 14 now archived at the University of California, San Francisco library in a full-text searchable electronic repository. 15 We initially searched the archives with broad search terms (e.g., corporate responsibility) and used retrieved documents to identify more specific search terms. We identified 150 Philip Morris documents, spanning 2000 to 2002. More detailed information on tobacco industry document archives and search strategies is available elsewhere. 14, 16 We analyzed documents with an interpretive approach. 17---20 In this type of historical analysis, "the focus of attention is on meanings. . . . Each document [is] reviewed carefully and the 'taken for granted' assumptions and viewpoints of the author[s] drawn out." 21(p151) Consistent with the analytic tradition within which we were working, we specified no preanalytic conceptual schema. 22---24 To develop this interpretive account, one of us (P. A. M.) reviewed all documents, and both authors reviewed selected key documents and took detailed notes. We relied on iterative reviews and discussions of documents and notes to identify common themes and clusters of meaning.
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RESULTS
When Mike Szymanczyk became Philip Morris's chief executive officer in late 1997, he concluded that Philip Morris was "out of alignment with society's expectations of a socially responsible company." 25 He based this conclusion on the then-numerous state lawsuits seeking to recover from tobacco companies Medicaid costs related to tobacco-caused disease. 25 Plummeting public opinion and Results. In exploring corporate social responsibility, Philip Morris executives sought to identify the company's social value-its positive contribution to society. Struggling to find an answer, they considered dramatically changing the way the company marketed its products, apologizing for past actions, and committing the company to providing benefits for future generations. These ideas were eventually abandoned. Despite an initial call to distinguish between social and economic value, Philip Morris ultimately equated social value with providing shareholder returns.
Conclusions. When even tobacco executives struggle to define their company's social value, it signals an opening to advocate for endgame scenarios that would encourage supply-side changes appropriate to the scale of the tobacco disease epidemic and consistent with authentic social value. (Am J Public Health. Published online ahead of print August 16, 2012 Senior management also suggested that reduction in harm was the company's social value, 60 reflecting its goal to develop and launch a cigarette with reduced "potentially harmful smoke constituents" by 2002. 63 Task force members did not initially embrace those suggestions. Although they acknowledged the importance of cigarette harm reduction, task force members noted that "there are also many other broader societal issues we need to put our attention to." 64 After meeting with senior management, task force members concluded that they still needed to determine the value of what Philip Morris provided and wondered if they would ever "come close to answering this question." 60 The Corporate Responsibility Task Force discussed the idea of pleasure for smokers as a possible social value but appeared to be wary of promoting it. For example, in an early meeting, a task force member wondered whether it was appropriate even to talk about pleasure as a possible product value or benefit. 65 (This was a stark contrast with the early 1980s, when Philip Morris and other tobacco companies funded a "social costs/social values" project in which academics developed arguments promoting smoking's alleged benefits.
66---68 ) Several months later, the task force was no closer to embracing pleasure as Philip Morris's social value. One member commented that "there is something about the word that gives me pause"; another noted that the word was open to misinterpretation. 64 The task force also debated whether the social value discussion should be limited to the product. 57 In its final recommendations to senior management, the Corporate Responsibility
Members of Philip Morris USA's Senior Management Team, 2000-2001
Task Force concluded that social value was not a particular thing, but rather an "on-going process of attempting to increase the positive and decrease the negative impacts of our Footprint" (defined by the task force as "what happens in the world as a result of a company's existence"). 64, 69, 70 Social value was the outcome of Philip Morris living up to its mission of responsibility. 71 Despite its similarity to an earlier senior management suggestion, this definition apparently dissatisfied the senior team: notes from a Corporate Responsibility Task Force---senior team meeting contain the observation that "we may need to strengthen the link between social value and economic value." 72 The task force agreed that "our contribution to social value is our license to operate which is our return to shareholder [sic] ." 72 
Statement of Principles
The Corporate Responsibility Task Force's difficulties were reflected in the evolution of a Statement of Principles, 73 which explained Philip Morris's plans for its mission of responsibility 74 and answered the "why are we h[e]re question." 51 An early draft by the task force, dated April 2, 2001, referred to social value in the first paragraph (a preamble): "We believe that for a corporation to be responsible, it must . . . constantly review and adapt their [sic] activities to assure that they create social value as well as economic value" (Table 1) . 74 A week later, the draft offered a less expansive commitment: "We will balance the interests of all stakeholders to ensure that we can contribute both financial and social value in the conduct of our business." 75 In an implicit reference to the task force's social value discussion, this draft also introduced principles centered on harm reduction and pleasure ( Philip Morris USA's commitment to the principles of corporate responsibility is based on our recognition and understanding that a company's activities and conduct impact the lives of individuals and societies. In our efforts to be a responsible corporate citizen, we will balance the interests of all stakeholders to ensure that we can contribute both financial and social value in the conduct of our business. . . . We are fully committed to acting in accordance with our principles and believe that we can deliver both economic and social value to all of our stakeholders as well as to society in general.
We will manufacture and market the highest quality tobacco products that meet the preferences and provide smoking pleasure to our adult consumers.
We will market our products to adult smokers in a responsible way. We will seek to develop methods of marketing and promotion that limit their visibility.
Because tobacco products pose a major public health problem, we will focus our efforts on harm reduction as it applies to our products and to our policies, programs and positions.
We will continually explore new methods and technologies to reduce the harm associated with our products. 77 Provide economic and social value to our shareholder to justify its confidence in us as a responsible and productive member of the company.
Manufacture and market the highest quality tobacco products that meet our adult consumers' preferences and provide them with smoking pleasure while continually exploring and implementing new methods and technologies to reduce the harm associated with our products.
Market our products to adult smokers responsibly.
Conduct our business so that our policies and actions provide benefits for future generations.
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78 Provide economic and social value to our shareholder to justify its confidence in us as a responsible and productive member of the company.
Market our products to adult smokers responsibly by ensuring we do not appeal to nonsmokers and that we encourage those who want to quit to do so.
Conduct our business so that our policies and actions provide benefits for future generations. 
Addressing the Past
Corporate Responsibility Task Force members also struggled with Philip Morris's past, specifically, "our history and the public's perception that we lied to them." 51 Precisely what the public considered the company to have lied about was never described, but a reference to the 1994 "image of the Congressional hearings" (at which 7 tobacco chief executive officers swore under oath that nicotine was not addictive and that cigarettes did not cause disease) 26(pp365---367) suggested that these lies concerned tobacco products' deadly and addictive nature. 51 At their first meeting in October 2000, task force members observed focus groups with the public discussing tobacco companies and responsibility. Debriefing notes indicate that the public wanted an apology from tobacco companies, and task force members discussed how Philip Morris might "reconcile with our perceived past to move forward." 51 In January 2001, the task force asked whether reconciliation was necessary: "Can we just say 'This is who we are now . . .?'" 89 The group identified pros and cons of "reconcil[ing] the past" through an apology or acknowledgment. Arguments in favor of an apology included the "tremendous power that can come from the unification around healing and be directed toward creating the future" and consistency with Philip Morris's stated value of integrity. 89 An apology offered a chance at closing the "partially healed wound that is still easily opened." 89 The task force also noted the potential for forgiveness: "Our society does allow that one can make serious mistakes even with the best of intentions." 89 However, an apology's emotional toll was unpredictable, making it difficult to compare the cost of an apology to that of saying nothing. 89 A task force member also noted that "along with the . . . apology/acknowledgement come defined changes in business practices. Without those changes any acknowledgment will be seen as insincere." 89 At least 1 task force member thought that to acknowledge the past and search for healing was the most important advice to the senior team that the Corporate Responsibility Task Force had to offer. 65 Accordingly, addressing the past was included on the group's list of ideas that should be presented to senior management at a March 2001 meeting (later rescheduled for April). 90 A draft meeting presentation asked senior management, "Do we need to reconcile our past before we can move forward with the present and into the future?" 91 However, later drafts make no reference to this question. 92, 93 Notes from the April meeting contain only 1 oblique reference to accepting responsibility for the past: "Accepting responsibility for intended consequences is one thing; how do we accept responsibility for unintended results or consequences?" 60 Later notes contain no further references to a possible apology, and the Corporate Responsibility Task Force's final July 2001 recommendations do not include reconciling the company's past as a potential corporate social responsibility focus area. 94 Instead, the task force noted, "We need to connect the past to the present and future by 'telling our story,'" 95 particularly to employees, and assigned this task (without further elaboration) to the senior team. 96 One component of this story may have been helping employees understand Philip Morris's evolving positions on tobaccorelated issues, 97 an issue discussed at earlier task force meetings. Another possible component of Philip Morris's story was the origin of the company's responsibility, referred to inside the company as "roots of responsibility." A task force member pointed out that a possible message conveyed by the task force's creation was that "in the past we've been irresponsible and now we're changing." 51 To avoid sending this message, several task force members identified examples of the company's responsible behavior in philanthropy, employee relations, diversity, product development, and organizational culture (e.g., arts sponsorship, funding of student internships, and introduction of domestic partnership benefits).
98---100
After a February 2001 presentation detailing these roots of responsibility, a Corporate Responsibility Task Force member reflected, "Once we start connecting all the pieces it becomes clear that we have been doing a lot of really good things for a long time." 101 Other task force members emphasized the company's consistent responsible intentions, pointing out that Philip Morris "has always wanted to be responsible" (emphasis added), but "along the way we had a disconnect with society's expectations of us." 101 A task force member also suggested engaging in a dialogue (with unnamed others) about the period when Philip Morris was disconnected from these expectations. 101 However, when the task force summarized its work to employees, 102 it did not mention this disconnect, focusing instead on Philip Morris's Notes from subsequent Corporate Responsibility Task Force meetings lack further elaboration on these ideas; however, an early Statement of Principles draft pledged to "work constructively with public officials and others to . . . assure that cigarette marketing is appropriate, given its health risks, and that marketing is minimally visible to minors" (Table 1) . 74 Initially, changes preserved the emphasis on minimally visible marketing: "We will market our products to adult smokers in a responsible way. We will seek to develop methods of marketing and promotion that limit their visibility. The task force next sought input on marketing and other responsibility principles from 27 employees; meeting notes contain an employee's observation that the phrase "responsible marketing" was undefined and a recommendation to define it as marketing that did not encourage youths or nonsmokers to smoke and did not discourage smokers from quitting. 109 The language initially approved by senior management for internal use was a pledge to "responsibly market our brands to adult smokers while neither advocating smoking nor discouraging quitting." 81 However, after further consideration by senior management and legal and other departments, 82, 86 this statement was changed once again to the more opaque "responsibly market our brands to adults who choose to smoke." 83 In July 2001, the task force recommended to senior management 3 social responsibility priority initiatives: (1) deal with, in their words, "environmental tobacco smoke," (2) reduce cigarette litter, and (3) enhance supply-chain management. 110 Public demands for greater corporate social responsibility suggest that organizational legitimacy depends in part on sustaining a perception that the company contributes social value. The company's chief executive officer seemingly recognized this when he directed the Corporate Responsibility Task Force to consider how Philip Morris might deliver large-scale social value. The task force failed in this task: its ultimate conclusion, that the company's social value was its continued ability to provide shareholder returns, merely restated as a social value all corporations' standard fiduciary obligation to company owners. The discussions recorded in the company's internal documents suggest that members of the task force may have recognized that this is not the same as authentic social value-and requires ignoring the vast social harm created by the enterprise. The absence of the term "social value" in Philip Morris's public Mission and Goals statement 88 suggests that the company has never managed to define it satisfactorily. Of course, task force members and senior management may have been satisfied with this definition of social value, seeing it as the logical outcome of lengthy deliberations among numerous people. Nonetheless, their struggle to identify Philip Morris's unique contribution to societal welfare suggests that the time may have arrived when it can be asserted that there is no real argument for the continued existence of the tobacco industry in its current form. This creates an opportunity to consider more radical alternatives, such as various endgame scenarios put forth by tobacco control scholars. 113---118 These scenarios offer policy alternatives that, by providing different incentives and controls that recognize the unique harmfulness of the tobacco business, could enable a tobacco company to contribute authentic social value. For example, Callard et al. recommend creating incentives for tobacco companies to reduce demand for tobacco products. 113, 114 Others have suggested achieving a de facto prohibition on smoked tobacco through a combination of high tobacco taxes, cigarette advertising bans, comprehensive restrictions on smoking in public places, and policies that encourage smokers to switch to nonsmoked forms of tobacco or (preferably) medicinal nicotine, perhaps even gradually phasing smoked tobacco products out of the market.
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Limitations
The document database is so large that we may not have retrieved every relevant document. Some may have been destroyed or concealed by tobacco companies 119 ; others may never have been obtained in the legal discovery process. In addition, because many of the documents we found were group meeting notes lacking extensive detail, our knowledge of the specific actors who advocated or opposed particular ideas and the length or intensity of interest in specific topics was limited. Several Corporate Responsibility Task Force participants were outside consultants whose views may not have reflected company views (although because 3 had previously worked with Philip Morris 120, 121 and 1 was a former Philip
Morris vice president, they were likely familiar with the company's views, policies, and constraints). It is also unknown why particular suggestions were ultimately rejected, although we observed a pattern of changes that occurred after senior management consultation.
Conclusions
Social value, as the Corporate Responsibility Task Force learned, has become exceedingly difficult for tobacco companies to claim. The Big Why question should be revisited in light of this failure, but asked publicly and in a new form: Why should society continue to sanction companies that create no social value and create so much harm for so many, in the process of creating profits for so few? j
